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This chapter analyses in which ways diffusion based on interdependent policy
learning explains the spread of active labour market policies (ALMP) in the
OECD countries. By applying error correction models using multiplicative
spatial Prais-Winsten regressions for analyzing the diffusion of ALMPs in 22
OECD countries from 1991–2013, we find evidence of governments adapting
labour market policy strategies that have proven successful, that is, perform
well in increasing labour market participation in other countries. However,
interdependent learning is conditional on the institutional framework: policy-
makers rather learn from the experience of other countries in the same welfare
regime. Even more importantly, the results bear witness to the importance
of the European Employment Strategy (EES) as an international coordination
framework facilitating policy learning.
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1 Introduction
Within the transformation of welfare states of OECD countries in past decades, active
labour market policies (ALMP) have marked a corner stone of what has been called
the “activation” or “social investment” turn (Bonoli 2013; Morel, Palier & Palme 2012).
While passive labour market policies (PLMP) aim primarily at social protection and in-
come replacement via unemployment insurance or assistance schemes, ALMPs represent
an important tool for raising labour market participation and combatting unemployment.
ALMPs consist of different tools like training, employment incentives, and job creation
schemes (Bonoli 2010, 2013). As with active social policies in more general, ALMPs are
seen as a promising approach for challenges arising from deindustrialization and concomi-
tant structural changes in employment, with which all Western democracies are confronted.
Activation strategies have also been strongly promoted by international organisations, par-
ticularly by the OECD since its Jobs Study (1994) and by the European Union (EU) with
the implementation of the European Employment Strategy (EES) in 1997. ALMPs were
first implemented in the Nordic welfare states, but gradually intensified by deindustrial-
ization, they have gained ground in all OECD countries. However, the tools of activation,
the level of spending on ALMPs in absolute terms and the relation of passive and active
labour market policy spending in particular as well as the timing of the turn varies greatly
across the OECD countries (Bonoli 2010, 2013). Alike, the effectiveness of ALMPs varies
remarkably, depending of the type of activation program. In general, though, there is some
evidence of the positive effect of activating unemployed (Kluve 2010; Martin 2014).
With the increasing importance of ALMPs, a large body of literature on the political
economy of ALMPs has emerged (e.g. Armingeon 2007; Bonoli 2010, 2013; Swank 2011;
Tepe & Vanhuysse 2013; van Vliet & Koster 2011; Vlandas 2013). The socio-structural
transformations of deindustrialization feature a necessary but insufficient condition for
changes in labour market policies towards more activation (Bonoli 2013:7). However, vari-
ance in labour market activation is also ascribed to both domestic politics, i.e. budgetary
constraints and partisan politics. Furthermore, several authors recognize the potential
importance of international factors for labour market reforms and diffusion processes in
particular. Only few empirical studies so far explicitly study the impact of diffusion pro-
cesses on ALMPs in a macro-comparative setting (Casey & Gold 2005; Franzese & Hays
2006; Swank 2011; Visser 2009). The empirical evidence of diffusional impacts is mixed.
On the one hand, economic interests and externalities channeled via interdependencies
between economic competitors and neighboring countries seem to be associated with do-
mestic labour market strategies to some extent (Swank 2011). Franzese and Hayes, find
that the subsidiarity principle of the EES results in free-riding on the ALMPs of neigh-
boring countries (Franzese & Hays 2006). On the other hand, there is surprisingly little
evidence of interdependence-based learning effects despite the similarity of the socioeco-
nomic pressures for adequate labour market policy solution across the OECD countries.
The same applies for soft coordination and coercion mechanisms pursued by supranational
organizations, and the EES, in particular (Bonoli 2013; Casey & Gold 2005; Visser 2009).
Of the early contributions, van Vliet and Koster (2011) as well as Armingeon (2007) find
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evidence for positive effects of the EES and mutual learning on the activation turn in
LMPs. However, a macro-comparative analysis of diffusion dynamics of ALMPs which can
be linked to learning from successful policies is still lacking. This is a research desideratum
which we explicitly address in this chapter.
This study focuses on the effects of interdependent policy learning on the diffusion of
active labour market policies in the OECD countries. In particular, we ask whether gov-
ernments learn from labour market policies of other countries that have proven successful.
By success, we mean good performance in increasing labour force participation and in
preventing unemployment in accordance with the expressed goals of activation programs.
Theories of policy learning stress that learning and concomitant (non-)adaption is always
contextual and thus conditional on the domestic and international framework within which
the policymakers operate (cp. Gilardi 2010; Weyland 2007; Meseguer 2009).1 We therefore
develop a model where policy learning is conditional on both the observation of success
and the domestic institutional context (modelled via welfare regimes) as well as the inter-
national context. Our results show that policymakers learn from successful ALMPs, but
mainly within welfare regimes, that is, in a similar institutional setting and legacy. Addi-
tionally, the EES as international coordination initiative to support ALMPs is a powerful
amplifier of learning processes. This study thus not only contributes to explaining the acti-
vation turn of OECD labour markets, but also to recent scholarship on conditional spatial
interdependence in policy-making based on learning (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Gilardi 2010;
Gilardi, Füglister & Luyet 2009; Neumayer & Plümper 2012; Volden 2006; Wasserfallen
2014).
We proceed by first discussing the theoretical rationale behind the assumption of policy
learning as a mechanism for diffusion of ALMPs in section two. Drawing on the scholarship
on interdependent policy-making, we develop hypotheses on from what governments may
learn and how their decisions to adapt experiences in connected abroad may be filtered by
the institutional context. Section three presents the operationalization of the dependent
and the independent variables and the methodological decisions. The empirical results of
the analyses are discussed in section four. We close by summing up the argument and
discussing the broader implications of the results in the conclusion.
2 Interdependent Learning, Institutional Contextualization
and Labour Market Policy Change: The Theoretical
Argument
There is a broad scholarly consent about the fact that policy makers are not only affected
by their domestic environment when making decisions, but also by policies, ideas and
institutions in connected countries (Graham, Shipan & Volden 2013; Maggetti & Gilardi
2014; Shipan & Volden 2012). The process of the spread of ideas, reforms and institutions
across countries, which is accelerated by the increasing interaction patterns in the era of
globalization, is captured by the theoretical concept of spatial interdependence, leading to
1This is also true for further mechanisms of policy diffusion, see e.g. Neumayer & Plümper 2012.
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diffusion. Diffusion may result from geographic, cultural, institutional or otherwise defined
proximity via four main mechanisms; competition, learning, emulation and coercion (Braun
& Gilardi 2006; Elkins & Simmons 2005; Gilardi 2013; Jahn 2006; Shipan & Volden 2008;
Shipan & Volden 2012; Simmons & Elkins 2004).
In case of labour market policy change, the question whether activation policies spread
across borders based on learning is particularly interesting in the OECD countries. Learn-
ing is most commonly defined as a process in which policy makers use the experience of
others to update their beliefs on the consequences of policies (Dobbin, Simmons & Garrett
2007; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000; Gilardi 2010; Meseguer 2004, 2006, 2009). From the ratio-
nalist perspective, policy makers who decide under uncertainty about the ultimate conse-
quences of policies “engage in a purposive search for information about possible results of
policies, observing vicarious experiences” (Meseguer 2009:18). Consequently, governments
as rational learners update their previous beliefs about the expected outcomes of certain
policies abroad and adopt successful policies. Different contextual factors can thereby be
crucial for the intensity of learning. From the perspective of the diffusion approach, dense
interaction patterns due to historical, cultural or political commonalities or economic ex-
change between countries amplify and enable learning, thus potentially leading to diffusion
of policies.
So far, diffusion and, in particular, diffusion by learning has only rarely been considered
in the ALMP literature (for quantitative approaches, see Franzese & Hays 2006; Hays,
Kachi & Franzese 2010; Swank 2011); for qualitative approaches, see Casey 2009; Visser
2009). However, the results of these studies are contradictory. Some empirical studies
show that neighboring countries benefit from ALMP efforts in other countries and these
countries are intended to free-ride on other countries efforts (Franzese & Hays 2006; Hays,
Kachi & Franzese 2010). As a result, diffusion occurs but is driven by free-riding. Yet
other studies find a positive relationship between competition-driven diffusion and ALMPs
which is filtered by the interaction of domestic and international factors (Swank 2011).
The role of learning in ALMP diffusion has gained only little attention, although there is
some evidence on interdependent policy learning in passive labour market policies (Gilardi
2010).
We start by the assumption that ALMPs are likely to diffuse across OECD countries,
because most of them are confronted with similar pressures caused by structural changes
in the labour market and budgetary constraints in financing their welfare systems. Simul-
taneously, there is an increasing interaction density among the OECD countries in general
(Swank 2011). Such functional pressures do not per se imply similar policy solutions or
convergence, but they constrain a necessary condition for the spread of ALMPs (Bonoli
2013) and make monitoring other countries’ solutions more likely. This assumption also
entails that policy makers are rational actors despite their ideological background and par-
tisan affiliation, pursue the common goal of increasing labour market participation and
learn from successful measures in other countries (Volden 2006; Weyland 2007).
Even in a highly interdependent setting, however, countries are not likely to learn simi-
larly from all countries and not even from all successful countries. According to Franzese
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and Hays, countries are more likely to learn from other countries with cultural or de-
mographic similarities, since these factors are more crucial than (geographic) proximity
(Franzese & Hays 2006: 184). Interdependence is not uniform among the units of analysis
and therefore, newer approaches to policy diffusion account for contextual and conditional
factors which filter and modify the impacts arising from interdependence (Neumayer &
Plümper 2012; Wasserfallen 2014). In case of labour market policy diffusion, the type of
welfare state sets institutional frame and policy legacy which potentially conditions and
filters impacts coming from abroad. Therefore, we account for the potential impact of the
institutional setup of the welfare states as a potentially important context factor in our
analysis. In case of ALMPs and social policy in more general, we argue that policy makers
are more likely to learn from members of the same welfare regime. First, welfare regimes
originate from similar socio-cultural roots, so that the same argument which is often used
in the diffusion literature, namely that families of nations feature a particularly dense and
effective interaction patterns, applies here. Common socio-cultural roots, in turn, amplify
diffusion processes. Second and more importantly, countries in the same welfare regime
share the same kind of institutional setting and organizational principles of social and
labour market policies, building the legacy on which activation policies fertilize (Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1999). Rational learning from policy measures which have proven effective
in a similar institutional framework is more likely than learning from policy success in
completely different settings (Casey & Gold 2005; Meseguer 2005, 2006; Radaelli 2004).
This applies for both simple learning from the policies in general within the same welfare
regime and for learning from the success of peers in the same regime. As Meseguer puts it
“governments learn rationally but from close, successful performers” (Meseguer 2006:57).
The role of international organizations in promoting certain policies is also crucial for
diffusion. Firstly, internationally coordinated action offers a platform for development and
dissemination of policy solutions and tools. Learning from the experience of others is easier
in an environment of shared knowledge and joint action. Secondly, international organi-
zations and coordinated action also forms social norms and thus pushes social learning of
adequate measures and esteemed goals (Hall 1993; Sabatier 1988; Checkel 2005; Radaelli
2008). In case of ALMPs, the implementation of the EES in 1997 which was later man-
ifested in the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) clearly offers an institutional frame
for promoting ALMPs in the EU member states, thus additionally reinforcing diffusion
of ALMP policies (Franzese & Hays 2006; De la Porte & Jacobsson 2012; van Vliet &
Koster 2011). With its peer-review system of labour market programs, the EES is an
important institution in promoting successful ALMP measures that previously have been
proven effective in other countries.2
Because of the similar problem pressure and the concomitant reforms in most of the
OECD welfare states in past few decades and the amplifying role of the EU, the OECD and
the World Bank in promoting active social and labour market policies, learning is probably
the most powerful mechanism of interdependence affecting social and labour market policies
2The OECD has also actively promoted ALMPs, but the impact of its recommendations is less evident
than that of the EU (Armingeon 2007). Due to our case selection of solely OECD member states, we
cannot account for OECD effects, though.
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Table 1: Possible combinations of institutional similarity and policy success
Previous policy success in observed country
Yes No
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A: Learning from success of similar coun-
tries
B: Learning from failure of similar coun-
tries
Observation: Increase of ALMPs lead to higher
employment rates in other countries within the
same welfare regime
Consequence: Successful policy moves of
other countries within the same welfare regime
will be adopted
Expectation: very likely; strong positive
relationship
Observation: Decrease of ALMPs lead to lower
employment rates in other countries within the
same welfare regime
Consequence: Policy makers learn from
unsuccessful policy moves in a similar setting
and move into the opposite direction
Expectation: unlikely; slightly negative re-
lationship
L
ow
C: Learning from success of dissimilar
countries
D: Learning from failure of dissimilar
countries
Observation: Increase of ALMPs lead to higher
employment rates in other countries outside of
welfare regime
Consequence: Policy makers learn from
successful policy moves in a dissimilar setting
and adjust their own policy portfolio accord-
ingly, despite institutional differences
Expectation: likely; slightly positive rela-
tionship
Observation: Decrease of ALMPs lead to lower
employment rates in other countries outside of
welfare regime
Consequence: Policy makers learn from
unsuccessful policy moves in a dissimilar
setting and move into the opposite direction
Expectation: highly unlikely; strong nega-
tive relationship
in general and ALMPs in particular (Armingeon 2007; De la Porte & Jacobsson 2012).
Specifically, in search for suitable policy tools, governments are likely to learn from their
peers, especially if their policy reforms have led to intended outcomes (Volden 2006; Gilardi
2010; Gilardi, Füglister & Luyet 2009). In case of ALMPs, positive outcome performance
can be defined as increasing labour market participation rate - bringing not only the
unemployed, but also the so far inactive segments of the working age population like
homemakers, women in particular, and disabled in the labour market. This reflects the
goals of the activation strategy even more adequately than reducing unemployment alone.
Table 1 illustrates our assumptions, their theoretical background, and consequential
expectations. The core of our argument is that learning from policy success and policy
failure is conditional on the institutional similarity between two countries. We argue that
it is rather unlikely that countries look straight at the top-performers without taking
institutional similarities into account that guarantee a certain degree of policy compatibility
(Casey & Gold 2005). This implies that learning from success is rather conditional on
the degree of institutional similarity of two countries. As argued above, we think that the
common principles of financing welfare as well as expenditure patterns can be derived from
the welfare regime distinction. In the case of ALMPs, it is standing to reason to use welfare
regimes as a proxy for similarity of the welfare architecture, since the implementation of
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active measures depends on a multitude of factors, e.g. benefit conditionality, underlying
principle of (male or adult) breadwinner model, women’s employment, self-responsibility,
and overall generosity of the welfare state.
Taking all these information together, we can derive four hypotheses from our theory that
will be tested in the empirical part of this chapter. Firstly, countries that are similar should
exhibit higher similarities in their policy outcomes than countries that are considerably
different. We expect that there is a considerable degree of learning from successful policies
between similar countries, thus our first hypothesis states that
Hypothesis A: Policy makers learn from successful ALMP measures of other
countries within the same welfare regime.
Secondly, policy makers do not solely look on successful policies, but also take infor-
mation from failing policies into account, which strengthens their beliefs which policies
should be implemented to achieve a certain goal, and, in turn, which policies do not help
in achieving a certain policy goal (Dunlop 2017; Volden 2016). This approach of taking
informations of positive and negative policy examples into account helps in evaluating and
comparing policy reforms and in getting a more coherent picture. Therefore, our second
hypothesis states that
Hypothesis B: Policy makers learn from unsuccessful ALMP measures of
other countries within the same welfare regime.
Thirdly, theory suggests that successful policies diffuse across multiple jurisdictions and
also dissimilar countries when they have been exceedingly successful. While this objection
contradicts our main argument, we think that – at least to a lesser degree – this is true.
However, while we do not deny that this relationship empirically exists, it is far less fre-
quent and only applicable to simple policies that can be implemented despite institutional
differences. Thus, our third hypothesis states that
Hypothesis C: Policy makers learn from successful ALMP measures of other
countries outside of the welfare regime.
Fourthly and finally, there is the possibility that policy makers could learn from un-
successful examples of other countries that are institutionally distinct. However, since
we argued that the effect of negative learning is comparatively weak to that of positive
learning, we finally hypothesize that
Hypothesis D: Policy makers do not learn from unsuccessful ALMP measures
of other countries outside of the welfare regime.
To sum up, our hypotheses outline possible combinations of policy learning nexuses
and institutional similarity. Diffusion of ALMPs in the OECD countries is channeled by
learning from successful examples and, to a lesser degree, by learning from unsuccessful
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examples. We expect countries participating in the EES to exhibit even stronger relation-
ships of learning, as the EES offers a forum of exchange, institutionalized assessment and
evidence-based recommendations.
In the following section, in a first step we will show descriptive empirical evidence of
converging ALMP expenditure. In a second step, we will explain the operationalization of
the independent variables in general and the spatial lag variables operationalizing learning,
in particular.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Dependent variable
The focus of our argument lies within the spatial interdependencies of the adaption of active
labour market policies. In contrast to passive LMPs, which grant income replacement in
case of unemployment, ALMPs seek to (re)integrate unemployed and inactive persons into
the labour market. We use the most commonly used measure of ALMPs, public expenditure
on ALMPs per unemployed3 as our key dependent variable. Because we are interested in
the growing importance of ALMPs, we look at the changes in the variable. The data
stems from the OECD.stat database and includes expenditure on several different types
of ALMPs: public employment services and administration of activation programs, direct
job creation, employment incentives targeted at employers, job-rotation and job-sharing
measures, start-up incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, and training.
Table 2 presents a descriptive overview of ALMP spending in 22 countries from 1991 to
2013. There is considerable variance both in the level and the change of ALMP expenditure.
It shows that Social Democratic countries exhibit the highest levels in ALMP spending,
followed by Conservative and countries within the Liberal cluster. Southern European
countries have, on average, the lowest spending on ALMPs. The Netherlands, which is
the country with the highest average ALMP spending per unemployed spends around ten
times more than the United States and eighteen times more than Greece. Differences in
levels are also large between welfare regimes: On average, the Social Democratic welfare
states show highest investment in ALMPs, followed by the Conservative welfare states.
However, trajectories in ALMP spending follow different paths in the Social Democratic
regime, e.g. Sweden having reduced its ALMP investment radically in the 1990s while
at the same time other countries in the Social Democratic regime have further increased
spending. Most of the Conservative countries are catching up to higher levels, whereas
ALMP spending has decreased in most the Anglo-Saxon countries. In Southern European
welfare states, ALMPs remain mostly marginal and spending overall decreases, with the
exception of Italy. Countries within the EU participating in the EES show significantly
higher levels of ALMP spending than countries outside of the EU and in general the
increases in spending have been higher.
But have ALMPs proven effective in increasing labour market participation, that is,
have they been successful? Notwithstanding the fact that changes in employment rates
3The variable is measured in constant 2010 US $, with correction for purchasing power parity.
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Table 2: ALMP expenditure in 22 OECD countries from 1991–2013.
Mean SD Start End ∆
Conservative
Austria 9955.04 2735.25 6954.36 11865.92 4911.56
Belgium 7841.85 1337.96 7903.73 7619.22 −284.50
France 8771.94 1293.22 6967.81 7091.91 124.10
Germany 10101.07 1810.44 12997.22 10327.38 −2669.84
Luxembourg 15274.15 5453.80 13785.37 16263.20 2477.83
Switzerland 12225.41 2998.24 8740.55 11614.69 2874.15
Total 10694.91 3815.22 9558.17 10797.06 1238.88
Liberal
Australia 4299.15 1023.47 1847.15 3267.84 1420.69
Canada 3304.35 376.41 3263.41 2557.70 −705.71
Ireland 9170.33 4278.18 3403.02 5873.23 2470.21
Japan 4079.12 2006.36 8593.63 3117.94 −5475.69
New Zealand 2956.18 1659.97 1184.49 2663.94 1479.45
United Kingdom 3421.81 1353.87 2849.49 2004.22 −845.27
United States 2318.17 505.85 2165.16 1651.28 −513.88
Total 4221.30 2896.18 3329.48 3019.45 −310.03
Social Democratic
Denmark 21778.08 8036.22 5398.84 20920.51 15521.67
Finland 7411.85 1798.04 9100.56 9488.50 387.94
Netherlands 22838.78 9874.79 11515.08 9611.30 −1903.78
Norway 19402.13 2809.82 13616.94 15974.09 2357.14
Sweden 15813.02 6254.17 36983.85 13384.15 −23599.70
Total 17448.77 8500.24 15323.06 13875.71 −1447.35
Southern European
Greece 1247.10 435.50 1426.85 559.65 −867.20
Italy 4122.71 1861.02 2062.51 2638.76 576.25
Portugal 4372.32 1771.73 5017.35 1545.56 −3471.79
Spain 3103.10 1736.57 2410.70 1475.20 −935.50
Total 3211.31 1974.80 2729.35 1554.79 −1174.56
Non-EES 7119.29 6087.21 6796.61 6707.42 −89.19
EES 10682.69 8144.38 8585.12 8044.58 −540.53
Total 8809.44 7349.07 7644.91 7341.65 −303.27
Note: Values represent spending of ALMP per unemployed, at constant prices (2010) and con-
stant PPPs (2010), in US Dollars. Data is taken from The OECD Social Expenditure Database
(SOCX). The subdivision of welfare regimes is based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera
(1996).
can be traced back to multiple factors, 77 per cent of increases in ALMP expenditure
coincide with subsequent increases in employment rates in our sample, while 58 per cent
of decreases correspond with employment rates in the following year. In times of economic
recession like the one at the beginning of the 1990s or the most recent crisis around 2008,
less increases in ALMP expenditures were implemented and yet where implemented, they
proved less effective in enhancing employment. In general, ALMPs thus prove successful
to a moderate extent in our measure in general, which conforms to more differentiated
findings about the effectiveness of ALMP programs (cp. Kluve 2010; Martin & Grubb
2001; Martin 2014). The presence of success is an important precondition for the empirical
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Table 3: Functional form and connectivity function of spatial lag variables
Previous policy success in observed country
Yes No
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A: Learning from success of similar coun-
tries
B: Learning from failure of similar coun-
tries
Spatial lag: Success (regime)
Functional form: κwiyj,t = yj,t−1 ×
Successj,t−1 × Regimei,j
Connectivity: j = countries within same
welfare regime as i
Spatial lag: Failure (regime)
Functional form: κwiyj,t = yj,t−1 ×
Failurej,t−1 ×Othersi,j
Connectivity: j = countries within same
welfare regime as i
L
ow
C: Learning from success of dissimilar
countries
D: Learning from failure of dissimilar
countries
Spatial lag: Success (others)
Functional form: κwiyj,t = yj,t−1 ×
Successj,t−1 × Regimei,j
Connectivity: j = countries outside wel-
fare regime of i
Spatial lag: Failure (others)
Functional form: κwiyj,t = yj,t−1 ×
Failurej,t−1 ×Othersi,j
Connectivity: j = countries outside wel-
fare regime of i
proof of our argument on interdependent learning.
3.2 Independent variables
Before we discuss the regression model, we present the independent variables which will
be used to explain changes in our dependent variable. The first group of independent vari-
ables are the spatial lags and their specific operationalizations, which capture the learning
nexuses hypothesized in the previous section. The second group of independent variables
capture institutional, socio-economic, and political characteristics and are subsumed under
control variables.
3.2.1 Spatial lags
In quantitative studies, spatial interdependence and impacts of diffusion are most com-
monly modeled by means of a spatial lag, which is based on a theoretically defined prox-
imity matrix indicating the interdependence of units (Franzese & Hays 2004, 2008). In
order to examine whether learning by success explains changes of ALMP expenditure, we
generate a set of spatial lag variables in three steps.
In the first step, lagged values of the dependent variable yjt−1 of every other country
within the sample are generated in a new variable. We assume that learning from success
as well as policy failure is a rather fast process, as policy makers can monitor short-term
labour market changes in other countries, and also because the need to find solutions to
higher labour market participation is pressing (Swank 2011). In the second step, we look
how differences within that variable are connected to changes in the outcome of a variable
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that captures the degree of success of a certain policy. That way, success is expressed
via a dummy variable when another country has increased (or decreased) its expenditure
on ALMPs and subsequently achieved an increase in labour market participation rate
the following year. Consequently, we create another variable that captures policy failure
when increases (or decreases) ALMPs expenditure within the observed country resulted
in a decrease in labour market participation rate the year after. In the third and final
step, we multiply these variables with spatial weighting matrices that either include all
countries within the same welfare regime of a country, or all countries outside the welfare
regime, respectively. The connectivity matrix is coded ‘1’ for membership in the same
welfare regime (i.e. Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal and Southern European
regimes) based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Ferrera (1996).4 In this step we account
for the assumption that spatial proximity (expressed as institutional similarity) of the
examined units determines from whom policy makers preferably learn. As described in the
theory section, the combination of both theoretical connectivity criteria (success/failure
and welfare regime/others) results in four possible outcomes that are captured by our
spatial lag variables.
To capture countries within our sample participate in the EES, we include a dummy
variable for countries participating in the EES, beginning in 1997. This variable plays an
important role in conditional diffusion of ALMP, as we point out later in the description
of the specification of a multiplicative model.
3.2.2 Control variables
To capture the functional pressures by business cycles and resulting growth and decline of
employment, we include GDP per capita as well as unemployment rate into our models.
Additionally, we also include the employment rate, since it is an important indicator for
overall employment and possible gender bias in labour market participation. We also
include the degree of deindustrialization into our models. It is measured by an indicator
introduced by Iversen and Cusack (2000), and is operationalized by the result of 100 minus
the sum of manufacturing and agricultural employment as a percentage of the working age
population. We expect the socio-economic control variables to explain an ample amount
of differences in ALMP expenditure, because of the functional relationship of spending
for ALMPs and economic performance. In order to account for the anticipated effects of
partisan government, we include a variable measuring the government position on a left
right axis (Jahn 2011a; Jahn et al. 2017). Contrary to a variable simply measuring strength
of a particular party in government, this measure is time-variant, sensitive to political
systems of countries, and portrays changes of ideology far more accurate. Additionally, we
also include the distance of the veto player into our analysis to model possible domestic
institutional constraints (Jahn 2011b; Tsebelis 2002). The variable captures the policy
distance of the agenda and the ideologically furthest (yet relevant) veto player for policy
bargaining. Since the literature is divided on the impact of partisanship on preferences of
4Japan and Switzerland are ambiguous in their attachment to one of the welfare regimes. Following the
classification by Huber and Stephens (2001) and Armingeon (2007), we assign Japan to the Anglo-Saxon
and Switzerland to the Continental European regime.
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ALMP spending, we expect no incisive influence of ideology on ALMP spending. Likewise,
we expect little inhibiting impact from veto players on ALMP spending.
3.3 Regression model
In order to test our hypotheses, we analyze changes in ALMP expenditure in 22 OECD
countries5 from 1991 until 2013 with an error correction model (Beck & Katz 2011; De-
Boef & Keele 2008; Podesta 2006). The estimation of the coefficients is conducted via
Prais-Winsten regressions with panel specific autocorrelation structure and panel corrected
standard errors. This ensures that the errors of the coefficients will be unbiased and unaf-
fected by panel specific characteristics. The structure a general form of an additive error
correction model is as follows:
∆yi,t = α0 + α1yi,t−1 +
∑
βk∆X
k
i,t +
∑
βlX
l
i,t−1 + εi,t (1)
where disturbances in the equilibrium of the dependent variable ∆yit are estimated by
the constant α0, a lagged dependent variable α1yi,t−1 (the so-called long-run multiplier),
two vectors X representing differences as well as as lagged levels of independent variables
of unit i, and white noise represented by ei,t.
We modify equation 1 in four essential respects and transform the model into a multi-
plicative spatial lag model. Firstly, we include a structural break term βe that subsumes all
countries participating in the EES after the year 1997. Secondly, row-standardized spatial
lag variables representing different weighting matrices w described in the previous section
will be added to the equation. Thirdly, two interaction terms βm and βn that are the
arithmetic product of the structural break term and the spatial lag variables will be added
to investigate the different forms of learning inside and outside of the EES, respectively.
Fourthly, we include unit fixed effects βd to account for unobserved panel heterogeneity
and unaccounted panel specific dynamics. These four additional specifications result in
the following equation:
∆ALMPi,t = α0 + α1ALMPi,t−1 +
∑
βk∆X
k
i,t +
∑
βlX
l
i,t−1 + βeEES
+ βmEES×
∑
j
[
wijt∑
j wijt
∆ALMPj,t
]
+ βnEES×
∑
j
[
wijt∑
j wijt
ALMPj,t−1
]
+
n−1∑
d=1
βdPanel dummies + εi,t
(2)
where i is a country at a specific time t which is influenced by the policy reforms of
another country j. The two vectors capture changes and differences economic and domestic
5Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States.
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politics variables. The spatial lag variables have four different functional forms outlined in
table 3 that represent the assumed nexuses of learning formulated in our hypotheses that
will be tested in our models.
4 Results
To test our theoretical propositions, we estimate one base model and eight models with
different spatial lags, which are all presented in Table 3. In each of the models the same
set of exogenous control variables is included to test the hypotheses on diffusion of ALMP
while maintaining a constant number of control parameters. The root mean squared error
(RMSE), which represents the standard deviation of the differences between predicted
values by the model and empirical values, has considerably low values.6 Regarding the
estimated coefficients as well as their standard errors, our results remain robust against
alternative model specifications.
The first model serves as our base model and solely estimates the impact of domestic
political, economic, and institutional variables on ALMP expenditure. On average, a third
of the overall disturbance in spending equilibrium gets corrected in the following year, as
can be seen with the help of the parameter measuring previous levels of the dependent
variable. The results show that, within the base model, differences in ALMP spending
are mainly influenced by variables representing short-term economic constraints, namely
changes in unemployment rates and economic growth, as well as participation in the EES.
When increasing unemployment, expenditure for ALMPs decreases, presumably because
spending on income compensating PLMP benefits increases. When GDP is growing, it
opens up opportunities for policy reforms and expanding activating measures. Overall,
changes in ALMP spending in countries participating in the EES are significantly higher.
We will further explain this relationship between changes in ALMP expenditure and the
EES in the following models that incorporate spatial lags for success and failure of policy
developments.
Factors representing domestic politics bear little to no explanatory potential for ALMP
expenditure change. Left governments are associated with a positive change in ALMP
spending which is in line with conventional partisan theory of welfare state development.
However, partisan effects are insignificant in every model and therefore we cannot make
substantial inference on the presence of a non-random effect of parties from these findings.
Also, institutional barriers to policy change which in our case are represented by the
ideological distance of the government to its veto players, have no significant effect. These
findings of no significant influence of both government ideology and policy distance to veto
players are in line with research on ideological influence on ALMPs in particular and active
social policies in more general, since the ideological fight over welfare policies is primarily
focussed on compensating benefits (Bonoli 2013; cp. also Beramendi et al. 2015).
6Interpreting the ratio of explained variance in an error correction model with fixed effects is futile, since
one can easily exchange the dependent variable with levels instead of differences and every parameter
except the lagged dependent variable change, while getting a much more higher ratio of explained
variance. However, the RMSE is robust to parameter exchange in the dependent variable and therefore
a more reliable parameter for judging on model fit.
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Figure 1: Fitted values of changes in ALMP expenditure per unemployed over range of
spatial lag variables.
Note: In each cell, plots on the left represent first differences (short-run effects) of the spatial lag variable,
while plots on the right represent levels (long-run effects). Estimates are taken from the multiplicative
terms interacted with the EES. Kernel density plots on the bottom of each graph show the empirical
distribution of the spatial lag variable, respectively.
In the remaining models we test our hypotheses on the effects of interdependent learning
from success and failure with the intermediate conditional role of welfare regimes. There-
fore, each model contains a set consisting of a short-term and a long-term row-standardised
spatial lag variable considering successful or unsuccessful policy moves of either all coun-
tries within the same welfare regime or outside of the regime in the sample.7 Figure 1
shows the effect of the spatial lags in the short and long-run on predicted values of ALMP
expenditure.
Models A1 and A2 incorporate the spatial lags operationalizing policy success within
welfare regimes and show whether governments learn from the success of ALMP policies
in other welfare regimes and, as a consequence, adjust their own policies accordingly. The
models show that there is a positive effect of spatial influence in the short as well as the
long-run on ALMP expenditure. When interacting the spatial lag variables with the EES
country-years, we can see that the overall positive influence of diffusion is solely driven by
7The assignment of each country to a welfare regime is documented in Table 2.
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countries participating in the EES, because these coefficients are exclusively significant.
This verifies hypothesis A, that policy makers learn from the success of others, particularly
when these other policy makers have implemented their policies in a similar institutional
framework, which we operationalized with welfare regimes. However, when there is no
learning framework present like the EES, then we can see no significant effect on policy
changes.
When looking at the models B1 and B2 that are incorporating the variables for policy
failure within welfare regimes, we can see that the relationship becomes overall negative.
This shows that not only are policy makers learning from positive successful examples,
but also from negative examples that have shown ineffective outcomes. Again, when mod-
eled in a multiplicative interaction term, we can see that this relationship is driven by
EES membership, clearly suggesting that an institutionalized learning framework helps in
evaluating effective and ineffective policies.
Models C1 and C2 contain spatial lags that measure successful policy moves outside
the welfare regime. Both models show that policy success of others has a significantly
positive influence on changes in the equilibrium of ALMP expenditure, however only in
the long-run. Furthermore, this effect is restricted to countries participating in the EES.
The fact that we can observe this effect exclusively in EES member countries and in the
long-run shows that the EES framework helps in overcoming institutional barriers and that
policies can ‘travel’ outside of welfare regimes, when the time frame is large enough. It
clearly shows that ALMPs are becoming increasingly important in the EU and that, despite
institutional barriers that potentially decrease the probability of policy learning, ALMPs
are becoming more and more present in policy portfolios of EU membership countries.
Policy failure has a significantly negative effect on changes in ALMP expenditure in the
short and long-run, as models D1 and D2 show. Again, as in previous models, this effect
is only present in countries participating in the EES. Again, this shows that the EES is
essential in evaluating success and failure of policy reform. This shows that in the nexus
of policy reforms both increasing and decreasing of ALMP expenditure and its outcomes
are taken into account This finding is also backed by the fact that within the models of
policy failure the constitutive term for EES membership is still positive and significant and
the spatial lags exert a negative influence on the dependent variable, indicating that both
learning from success and failure take place in the regression models.
5 Conclusion
The main finding of this chapter is that diffusion of labour market policy activation via
learning is indeed evident in modern welfare states since the beginning of the 1990s. Policy
makers learn from the success or failure of ALMPs in increasing labour market participa-
tion rates in other countries. However, learning is conditional to the institutional context.
First, policy makers are more likely to learn from LMPs of their peer countries within the
same welfare regime. Referring to the experience of other countries with similar welfare
architecture bears advantages which directly affect the payoffs of a policy change. Selective
learning makes it easier to estimate the consequences of a policy within the specific insti-
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tutional and even cultural setting. Given the similar institutional nexus of labour market
and social policies as well as the similar levels of ALMP spending within welfare regimes,
monitoring the shifts and their effects in peer countries offers policy makers some certainty
about the consequences of changes in LMP effects at a similar starting level. Our findings
strengthen both the view of the role of interdependence and also path dependency of wel-
fare policy change resulting from the institutional context of the welfare regimes (Pierson
2001). Furthermore, a simple emulation of foreign concepts seems unlikely in this case,
since there are subtleties in the institutional arrangements of different countries even if
they feature the same welfare regime (Casey & Gold 2005).
Second, and even more unequivocally, our results give further evidence on the impor-
tance of international co-ordination and intergovernmental organizations in policy learning.
The EES powerfully fortifies diffusion of successful ALMP policies, regardless of whether
we observe change in spending levels or the levels as such. The EES framework may, first,
foster exchange on experiences, solutions and best practices and thus increase the informa-
tion which policymakers can access to in search for solutions in their own country. Second,
the coordinated action also promotes social norms and thus promotes social learning and
– eventually – paradigmatic change of social policy. A further socialization-related aspect
not considered further in this study is that intergovernmental organizations may also play
a crucial role in competition-driven diffusion by setting limits to the extent of competi-
tion that is considered acceptable. Although this argument was developed with regard to
tax policies (Gilardi & Wasserfallen 2016), it may also apply for free-riding dynamics of
interdependence of labour market policy (cp. Franzese & Hays 2006).
Regarding the different operationalizations and functional forms of our spatial lag vari-
ables that accounted for institutional framework as well as previous (un)successful policies,
our analysis demonstrated that it is important to account for the underlying theoretical
concept within the construction of the variables (Gilardi 2016; Neumayer & Plümper 2016).
As we have demonstrated, a mere accounting of geographical proximity when constructing
spatial lag variables would not have resulted in variables capturing the complex dynamics
of learning from successful policies of other countries with the a similar welfare architecture.
While the results give rather strong evidence on the diffusion dynamics of ALMPs in
the OECD countries, our use of ALMP expenditure as the dependent variable bears some
shortcomings. Since activation policies at labour markets comprise of very different tools
(Bonoli 2013; Martin 2014), a more detailed look at which tools actually diffuse and which
of the ALMPs are more prone to learning dynamics would be desirable. Different tools
would also require different measures of success. However, we are still largely lacking such
detailed data over time and across countries on ALMPs. Case studies would complement
our macro-comparative results and, moreover, also deepen our understanding on how ex-
actly policy-makers learn, how they evaluate success and how and when they update their
prior beliefs.
In general, the results of this study attest to the importance of the institutional frame-
work for interdependent policy making and thus further endorse the plea for explicitly
considering the relevance of time-invariant or slowly changing institutional contextual fac-
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tors in the study of policy diffusion (cp. Neumayer & Plümper 2012; Wasserfallen 2014).
Assumptions on the mechanism and intervening factors on learning should thereby be mod-
elled in empirical analyses of spatial dependency (cp. Gilardi 2016; Neumayer & Plümper
2016). Regarding the developments within the time-series analyzed in this study, the re-
sults emphasize the continuing relevance of the welfare regime types. However, regarding
active social policies, we can see that an institutionalized policy learning framework such as
the EES can push boundaries of policy learning solely restricted on institutionally similar
countries, especially in the long-run. Although we do not consider political outcomes of
labour market policy reforms in this analysis (cp. Gilardi 2010), the significant effect of
policy learning from successful policy outcomes of peers featuring similar institutional and
cultural settings may also imply that policy makers monitor and anticipate the political
acceptance of similar moves and their consequences in similar welfare states. Therefore,
outcomes in both policy and politics should be accounted for when analyzing diffusion by
learning. Finally, our findings point out the potential of international tools like the EES in
intensifying learning from best practices. The direct and conditional effects of such learning
networks should be included in studies of policy diffusion to accurately model the indirect
influence of other policy jurisdictions on reforms in a country. As the previous chapters
in this edited volume have shown (Note to Claire: references to chapters Reitig; Fasois;
Daviter could be inserted here), case studies of the spread of specific policies deepen our
understanding of the dynamics of learning in an institutionally constrained environment
to complete the overall picture.
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Appendix
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables, 1991–2013.
Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
∆ALMP per unemployed −101.56 2312.67 −23549.59 11668.21
ALMP per unemployedt−1 8911.00 7603.50 457.38 48356.58
Economic controls
∆Unemp. rate in % 0.13 1.15 −3.39 6.60
Unemp. rate in %t−1 7.29 3.74 0.58 24.79
∆Civ. emp. ratio 0.19 1.26 −5.78 4.67
Civ. emp. ratiot−1 69.17 9.53 45.24 106.24
∆GDP per capita −0.02 2.18 −8.21 12.97
GDP per capitat−1 117.83 32.44 66.36 252.72
∆Debt (% of GDP) 1.65 6.41 −19.38 56.16
Debt (% of GDP)t−1 69.48 34.84 4.64 215.36
Domestic politics parameters
∆Government (LR) 0.02 3.11 −18.80 18.20
Government (LR)t−1 2.14 5.60 −12.79 21.84
∆Veto player (LR) 0.14 4.16 −21.93 23.79
Veto player (LR)t−1 7.47 7.92 0.00 36.82
Spatial lags
∆Success (regime) −34.74 913.71 −3572.88 3072.64
Success (regime)t−1 847.48 924.60 0.00 4148.83
∆Failure (regime) 27.76 799.01 −2714.86 3609.01
Failure (regime)t−1 462.60 669.48 0.00 4104.90
∆Success (others) −121.34 2148.19 −6090.88 4255.57
Success (others)t−1 3023.71 2187.46 0.00 8618.62
∆Failure (others) 107.81 2030.29 −5184.62 6906.42
Failure (others)t−1 1699.25 1635.56 0.00 7756.48
Note: Values represent spending of ALMP per unemployed, at constant prices (2010) and constant PPPs
(2010), in US Dollars. Data on dependent variable and economic controls is taken from OECD.stats.
Domestic politics parameters are taken from PIP database (Jahn et al. 2017).
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